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Abstract
Little is known on how and whether central bank announcements aect consumers'
beliefs about policy relevant economic gures. This paper focuses on consumers'
perceptions and expectations of ination and interest rates and condence therein.
Based on a sound identication (running surveys shortly before and after communi-
cation events), and relying on above 15 000 observations, spanning over 12 FOMC
press conferences between December 2015 and June 2018, we document the impact
of the central bank communication on ordinary people. While announcement events
have little measurable direct eect on average beliefs, they make people more likely
to receive news about the central bank's policy. In general, informed consumers
tend to have lower perceptions and expectations, higher condence and, to an ex-
tent, better quality beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Policy communication has long been a crucial tool for central banks to steer expectations,
and arguably became more so with the onset of the most recent global nancial crisis and
the introduction of forward guidance. While there is plenty of empirical support for the
impact of central bank announcements on nancial markets and, to some extent, on pro-
fessional forecasters, there is almost no evidence on how these announcements inuence
the mindset of consumers.1 Consequently, Blinder et al. (2008) p. 941, emphasize, Virtu-
ally all the research to date has focused on central bank communication with the nancial
markets. It may be time to pay some attention to communication with the general public.
This is particularly relevant as expectations of market professionals and consumers may
signicantly dier.2 Understanding the eect of a central bank's communication on the
information set and the resulting beliefs of the general public is pivotal for central banks
because the eectiveness of monetary policy depends on how well people understand its
goals and strategies (Bernanke, 2007), and at the same time critical for ordinary people,
as their potential non-response to or misinterpretation of the central bank's actions might
reduce welfare by guiding into inferior choices. Given the current eorts of many central
banks to use new channels of communication, such as social media, to achieve ordinary
consumers, it is important to establish whether and to which extent news about central
bank policy reach ordinary consumers under the current communication regime.
The lack of empirical evidence on ordinary people's awareness of the moves of the
central bank and on its implications is mainly due to the fact that existing datasets do
not allow for a timely tracking of consumers' beliefs, and the information collected does
not suce for a complete assessment.3 Typical consumer surveys, like the University of
1Policy announcements by central banks have been shown to aect nancial markets (see e.g.
Conrad and Lamla (2010) for exchange rates, Faust et al. (2007) for interest rates and exchange rates,
Rosa and Verga (2008) for asset prices), and there is some evidence that communication can improve
professional forecasters' predictions of future interest rate changes, as compared to Taylor-rule based
predictions (see, e.g., Sturm and de Haan (2011)). Sinha (2015) demonstrates forward guidance aects
investors' beliefs about current and future risks as extracted from derivative prices.
2For example, Allcott (2011) nds U.S. consumers signicantly overestimate future energy prices as
compared to expectations derived from traded futures contracts.
3In his 2018 AEA meeting discussion of Haldane and McMahon (2018), Refet Gurkaynak noted that
if you wanted to look at national experiments, ... you had to do this with nancial market data, because
nancial market data is high frequency, and... you can't survey people all the time. [But] you don't have
to survey them all the time, you just have to survey them right before the announcement goes out and
right after the announcement goes out. This is exactly what we do in this paper.
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Michigan Survey of Consumers, render monthly frequency data at best, which prevents
exact identication as the change in expectations between months is blurred by events
happening within this period. To tackle this issue, we conduct a series of original surveys
tailored to our needs in terms of both identication and variables capturing the eects
of announcements. The surveys are administered in rounds of two, one just before and
one right after a monetary policy announcement. This helps us to precisely pinpoint the
inuence of central bank announcements on the mindset of consumers. The content of
the survey is catered to our needs by having questions on expectations and perceptions
on ination and interest rates. We also ask about subjects' condence in their estimates.
Along with that, we control for the information set by asking whether people have re-
cently heard news about monetary policy and account for a large set of socioeconomic
characteristics.
Specically, we survey a stratied random sample of the general U.S. public up to two
days before and after the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) press conference.
We focus on the Federal Reserve Board because it is the only central bank at the time
of writing of this paper, which began and was widely believed to continue to adjust their
interest rate path after a decade of stable interest rates. This study covers the period
from the rst post-crisis interest rate hike in December 2015 to June 2018, including
seven changes in the target federal funds rate. This gives us over 15 000 responses by
representative individuals.
Previewing our empirical results, announcements exert little eect on perceptions and
expectations of either ination or interest rates by consumers. However, announcements
trigger an increase in the proportion of people who have heard monetary policy news.
People who receive news on monetary policy have lower perceptions and expectations and
higher condence in their beliefs. Furthermore, we nd some evidence that they also have
more accurate beliefs about ination.
Theoretically, if expectations are rational, as in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and
Faust and Svensson (2001), the press conference itself does not matter for beliefs, yet
the dissemination of news (the information set) does. One could model the impact of
communication events by splitting the expectation formation process into two regimes:
2
after the communication event, when the central bank credibly announces its monetary
policy, people have to incorporate this news in their expectation model (this approach
is adopted, for example, in Eusepi and Preston, 2010, 2012). Prior to the announcement
news coverage and expert opinions already equip consumers with easily interpretable and
ready to use information. An announcement by the central bank thus potentially aects
expectations of consumers in two ways: rst, by increasing the precision of the information
about future developments, due to the actual information content of news, and, second,
by increasing the probability of being exposed to news as the amount of news increases.
Some consumers would have received expert reports before the announcement, and their
beliefs may therefore be unaected by the press conference. Others would miss news both
before and after the announcement, and also remain unaected. But there may be a
cohort of consumers who did not receive any news before the announcement, yet higher
news coverage after the announcement makes them informed. If it also aects their
expectations, the average expectation in the sample may change. We study therefore
both the overall eect, and the two channels - updating of beliefs, conditional on the
information set, and changes in exposure to news.
This paper is linked to several strands of research. In terms of how central bank
communication aects non-expert beliefs, it relates to Haldane and McMahon (2018),
Coibion et al. (2018) and Coibion et al. (2019). Haldane and McMahon (2018) survey
MPhil students and the general public to investigate the impact of monetary policy com-
munication on consumers' beliefs by focusing on the accessibility of the message conveyed.4
Coibion et al. (2018) look at ination expectations of managers. In particular, managers,
similar to consumers, expect higher ination than professional forecasters do. Additional
information on monetary policy changes their rms' investment behavior. While this sup-
ports the relevance of the central bank communication, the eect is short lived, and the
authors conclude that more aggressive and direct means of communication are needed.
Coibion et al. (2019) conduct a randomized controlled trial of U.S. households and ana-
4In their experiment, participants from general public and Oxford MPhil students outlined their
expectations for CPI ination, unemployment and interest rates over the two year horizon. They were
then given either the traditional summary of the decision of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy
Committee, or the simplied version of it, and subsequently, an opportunity to adjust their reported
beliefs.
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lyze how dierent types of communication regarding monetary policy aect consumers'
ination expectations. They show that providing households with simple statistics has
a much larger eect on expectations than oering them the post-meeting statement or a
news article.
With regard to consumers' expectations, our paper relates to research analyzing how
their expectations and perceptions are formed and which factors drive them. Easaw et al.
(2013) as well as Dräger and Lamla (2017) analyze how expectations of consumers are
adjusted and which factors might aect the adjustment process. van der Cruijsen et al.
(2015) distill from a survey how much consumers know about the European Central
Bank's objectives. Two recent papers have analyzed the extent to which consumers and
professionals understand relevant economic concepts. Carvalho and Nechio (2014) use the
Michigan survey of consumers to explore how many people are aware of the Taylor rule,
while Dräger et al. (2016) look at both consumers and professionals and check whether
central bank communication can improve their understanding and increase the share of
people whose expectations are consistent with the Taylor rule, the Phillips Curve and
who are able to separate nominal from real gures; news on monetary policy are found to
improve consistency.
Finally, related to the literature on the role of mass media, our ndings conrm and
emphasize the relevance of the media news channel of the transmission of policy an-
nouncements (Berger et al., 2011; Böhm et al., 2012; Reid et al., 2011) and characterize
the mechanism of the impact of announcements on people's perceptions and expectations
of interest rates and ination. Berger et al. (2011) see two primary functions for the
media: (1) dissemination of the information about the central bank decisions, and (2)
improving the understanding of those decisions by the public. They analyze the media
coverage of the ECB announcements and nd, inter alia, that central bank communica-
tion intensies media coverage. Similarly, Binder (2017) shows that media coverage of
the Fed and its Chair is elevated on the day of or following a press conference. Still,
its impact on expectations and decisions of the public remains unknown; in particular, it
needs to be shown that increased coverage (supply of news) leads to an increased exposure
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(absorption of news by consumers).5 This is an aspect where we contribute to this strand
of literature.
Our main irrelevance result, i.e. no impact of announcements on either beliefs or con-
dence of consumers, indicates poor eciency of the existing policy communication regime,
especially in stark contrast with how markets and professionals react to announcements.
The good news is that press-conferences indeed trigger better outreach: more consumers
receive news about the Fed. Even though one could wish more people get the news, the
burning question is whether information that people receive about the Fed helps guide
their beliefs and decisions. So far our data reveals only a very limited impact, and this is
where central banks should concentrate their eorts. So far we observe a signicant gap
in beliefs and condence between informed and uninformed individuals. Thus the work
should be directed not only at making more people informed, but also at making them
understand the information they receive. All in one a big agenda to make policy news
matter for little people.
2 Identication strategy, survey design and data
At the heart of the paper is a sound identication strategy which allows us to better
isolate the eects of announcement events on consumer perceptions and expectations.
We conduct a survey of the U.S. public in rounds that are precisely timed around regular
FOMC press conferences. The timeline of our data collection per announcement event is
as follows: First wave invitations are sent out on Monday morning, 2 days ahead of the
FOMC press-conference on a Wednesday, and the second wave invitations are sent out on
Thursday. The speed with which responses are collected is vital for the identication. If
responses in each wave are collected quickly, we end up with two non-overlapping cross-
sections of expectations and perceptions taken within a maximum of 5 days between each
other, minimizing the impact of other possible macroeconomic factors. Conventional ways
to target respondents (letters or telephone interviews) do not allow one to collect enough
responses within this short event window, therefore we resort to an online survey platform,
5That media aects nancial markets is widely accepted, e.g. see Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012)
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Surveymonkey.com.6 Each wave covers 400-600 responses; usually, this target is achieved
within 6 hours or less. Surveymonkey incentivizes respondents by oering an opportunity
to win a sweepstakes prize, earn credits to redeem for rewards, or make a donation to a
charity of respondents' choice upon completion of the survey. Pre-registered users (over
18 years old) are invited to participate in the survey. The panels are balanced according
to census data of age and gender; according to the provider, "location tends to balance out
naturally". While selection is intentionally random from a panel of millions of potential
respondents, there is an additional guarantee that the repeated survey is not sent to the
same people within any 100-day period.
The survey covers 15 questions.7 The full questionnaire is in Appendix A. The core
questions relate to perceptions and expectations of ination and interest rates. We adapt
the style of the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers for questions on perceptions
and expectations of ination and interest rates. For instance, the question on perceived
ination is worded as "From your perspective, by how much did prices in general change
during the past 12 months? Please use the drop-down menu below. For example, if
you think prices on average have decreased by about 5%, choose "down by 5%"; if you
think they have risen by 5%, choose "up by 5%"", and the question on interest rates
is "What annual interest rate do you think an average US citizen would be charged, if
they take a car loan of $ 10,000 this week? Please use the drop-down menu below." As
central bank communication might aect not only the level of expectations but also the
degree of perceived uncertainty (communication might reduce uncertainty with regard
to ination or interest rates without changing their expected levels) we also ask how
condent respondents are in their answer by using a 5-point scale. Such a condence
question follows each of the four perception and expectation questions.
An important innovation is the inclusion of the exposure to news question "During
the last week, have you heard any news about the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve
6Binder and Rodrigue (2018) compare an online survey-based information experiment to study con-
sumers' formation of ination expectations with other non-web-based survey experiments and show that
the web-based format yields reliable results. Other studies using data collected through Surveymon-
key include, e.g., Solnick and Hemenway (2009) and Wiswall and Zafar (2015). Alternative platforms
(e.g. Qualtrics, as in Bursztyn et al. (2014)) oer a similar service, yet with a dierent incentive scheme
(participants are directly paid for responses).
7Having the survey short keeps subjects motivated (Vinogradov and Shadrina, 2013) and helps achieve
high completion rates.
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(Fed)? What did you hear?" The answer options are formulated as "I have heard that the
Fed would raise/keep at the current level/lower interest rates" in each pre-announcement
wave, and as "I have heard that the Fed is raising/keeping at the current level/lowering
interest rates" in each post-announcement wave. This wording is chosen to signal the
modality: the potential event (potential mood in linguistics) in the pre-announcement
wave versus the actual fact (realis mood) post-announcement. The grammatical emphasis
on the "actual fact" is implicit, in order to avoid explicitly mentioning the policy an-
nouncement event. The answer options also include "I have NOT heard any news about
the Fed policy" and "I have heard some other news about the Fed, namely:" with a
possibility of a free-text answer.8
In terms of control variables, we have an extensive set of characteristics we can con-
dition on like age, gender, household income, U.S. census region or even the device type
used by respondents. In addition, we assess participants' nancial literacy by asking how
many of the four statements (equivalent to QK4 b and QK5 a, b and c in INFE (2011))
shown in one question are true. By design, all of them are true, thus the answer gives
us a measure of nancial literacy on the scale 0-4. On average, slightly below 50% of
participants recognize that all 4 questions are true.9 For reference, the 2015 S&P Global
FinLit Survey (Klapper et al., 2015), using a more detailed and comprehensive method-
ology, found about 57% of adults in U.S. are nancially literate, which is a comparable
gure to ours.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables.10 In our data ination
expectations have a median of 5 and fall in the same range as beliefs in D'Acunto et al.
(2018) who survey U.S. consumers via the Kilts-Nielsen Consumer Panel, yet the median
8We check the clarity of questions by analyzing free text responses and comments of respondents.
Notably, in the post-announcement survey, many respondents who choose "some other news" option,
indicate they heard news the Fed intended to decide but they didn't know what the actual decision was.
This speaks in favor of our modality wording.
9Some 23% respondents answer that 3 out of 4 are true, 17% answer that 2 out of 4 are true, and the
remainder reports that either one or none are true.
10Data is truncated by removing respondents who spent less than 150 seconds or more than 900 seconds
to answer our questionnaire. The median time spent on the survey was 340 seconds. In trials we noted
that when people make an eort to reect on their answers it takes 3 minutes or more to complete the
survey. We treat respondents with long completion times (over 900 seconds) as inattentive. Moreover,
all estimations remove the top and bottom 5% of the dependent variable. Truncation by time spent on
the survey sacrices less than 3% of the sample on top of this truncation by reported values. Results are
qualitatively robust to variations in these truncation criteria.
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is higher than reported in other surveys like University of Michigan of Consumer or the
New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations (average median ination expectation
of 2.6 over our period). We believe this dierence is due to the sample selection. Both
Michigan and FRBNY surveys operate with a sample where a large fraction of partic-
ipants took part in the previous waves of the survey (up to 80% in FRBNY), and the
sample selection procedure involves contacting participants who previously completed the
questionnaire and thus are likely to do so again. In contrast, in our survey, an eort
is made to minimize the repetition, as conducting such a survey may draw subjects' at-
tention to news on ination and central banks, and thus articially inate the fraction
of informed consumers in subsequent rounds. Dräger and Lamla (2017) nd that in a
repeated sample absolute forecast errors decrease between interviews, which may explain
lower values of ination expectations in Michigan and FRNBY surveys. Similarly, Kim
(2019) shows using the Survey of Consumer Expectations of the New York Fed that survey
respondents that have been repeatedly interviewed have 2.1% lower ination expectations.
Econometrically speaking, a level dierence is not relevant as long as the survey responses
are meaningfully correlated with the true ination perceptions/expectations. To further
validate the quality of our survey responses, we calculate the correlation coecient be-
tween our monthly average and the monthly average of CPI, the Michigan Survey ination
expectations and the Survey of Professional Forecaster ination expectations. The corre-
lation coecient between perceived ination based on our data and the ocial CPI gure
is 0.5; the correlation coecient between expected ination in our data and the survey
of professional forecasters is 0.27. This positive and statistically signicant co-movement
between reality/best possible forecast and perceptions/expectations is reassuring.
The condence variable in Table 1 is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if respondents
report condence level of 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale. Less than half of respondents show
this degree of condence, signifying a large bit of uncertainty they face when reporting
expectations and perceptions. Condence in future values is lower than that in current
rates: 43-44% respondents say they are condent in their perception of the past ination
and interest rate, while only 35-40% are condent in their estimate of the expected in-
terest rate and ination rate. A rather obvious explanation would be that it is harder
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median SD
Past Ination (PastIn) 7.64 5.00 5.89
Expected Ination (ExpIn) 6.05 5.00 4.70
Past Interest Rate (PastRate) 7.02 6.00 3.68
Expected Interest Rate (ExpRate) 8.16 7.00 4.39
Condence Past Ination 0.43 0.49
Condence Expected Ination 0.40 0.48
Condence Past Interest Rate 0.44 0.49
Condence Expected Interest Rate 0.35 0.47
News Fed 0.35 0.48
Announcement 0.50 0.50
Gender 0.51 0.50
Age 46 52 15.17
Notes: SD denotes the standard deviation of the corresponding series.
to predict the future than to reect on the present. Along with perceptions and expec-
tations, condence is our variable of interest in detecting the impact of monetary policy
announcements on beliefs.
The main explanatory variable in our design is the variable Announcement. It takes a
value of 1 if the respondent belongs to the post-announcement subsample and 0 otherwise.
By construction, the split between pre- and post-announcement is roughly half-half. The
second key explanatory factor is the variable capturing whether the respondent reports
having heard some news on the Fed in the last week (News Fed). Again it takes a
value of 1 if the respondent reports having heard something about what the Fed would
do (before the announcement) or has done (after the announcement). About 35 percent
of respondents report having heard some news about the Fed. This number includes
all subjects who report anything but I have not heard any news about the Fed. The
number seems low, but not unexpected as our sample consists of ordinary consumers, not
professional forecasters. The variable Gender shows an appropriate balance between men
and women in our sample.
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Figure 1: Eects of Monetary Policy Announcement Events
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Notes: Kernel density plots. The blue line shows the distribution of perceptions and expectations of
individual respondents 1-2 days before the announcement event. The red line depicts the distributions
of expectations and perceptions 1-2 days after the announcement event.
3 Results
3.1 Mean Eects
We begin our analysis by comparing the densities of expectations and perceptions of in-
ation and interest rates before and after the announcement. In Figure 1 each panel plots
two distributions (kernel densities): the pre-announcement distribution is shown in blue
and the post-announcement in red. While we observe a slightly increased concentration
of the post-announcement densities with some shift to the left, the changes are not sub-
stantial: the announcement eect on expectations and perceptions of both ination and
interest rates is close to nil.
One might argue that nding almost no dierences between pre- and post-announcement
samples in this graph might be due to the underlying dispersion, particularly reecting
variation in actual ination and interest rates or the monetary policy stance across an-
nouncements. To get a feeling for the relevance of this variation over time we purge the
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Figure 2: Eects of Monetary Policy Announcement Events Purged by all Fixed Eects
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Notes: The blue line shows the distribution of the residuals of expectations and perceptions purged by
all xed eects 1-2 days before the announcement, while the red line depicts the distributions of the
residuals 1-2 days after the announcement. Specically, they are residuals from the following estimation:
yi = α+ τt + εi where τt captures announcement event xed eects.
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distribution by time/announcement specic eects. For this purpose we run the regres-
sion yi = α + τt + εi , where τt accounts for time/announcement-specic xed eects,
and plot the residuals of this estimation. Figure 2 shows perceptions and expectations
before and after announcements, purged by time xed eects. The conclusion remains
the same: we observe a very minor, if at all noticeable, eect of announcements. The only
visible dierence of this cleaning exercise is that both distributions became somewhat
smoother.11
Finding no announcement eect in the whole sample may be due to a failure of either
the information channel (no updating of beliefs) or the news channel (low or no change in
the number of informed subjects), or both. To test the relevance of the exposure to news
channel, Figure 3 compares expectations and perceptions of consumers who heard some
news about the Fed's monetary policy with those who did not receive such news. As in
Figure 1, we use kernel densities, marking expectations and perceptions of subjects who
were not exposed to news with the blue line, and using the red line for consumers who
report that they heard some news on the Fed policy decision. Figure 3 reveals a substantial
and statistically signicant dierence12 between the two cohorts. Generally, the densities
are more centered, and perceptions and expectations are less dispersed for consumers who
heard the news. Purging perceptions and expectations by time xed eects, similarly to
Figure 2, again only smoothed out the distributions but does not aect the result: beliefs
in cohorts with dierent exposure to news dier.
For a more rigorous analysis of the role of announcements we regress perceptions
and expectations of ination and interest rates on announcement events. Given our
identication approach, the following regression allows for a causal interpretation of the
role of announcements on perceptions and expectations:
yi = α + βA · A+ ΓZi + εi, (1)
11For reasons of robustness we also purged the distribution by all time, region and demographic xed
eects. Results remain the same.
12Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Epps-Singleton two-sample test of similarity of distributions
lead to qualitatively identical results, not rejecting similarity of distributions before and after the an-
nouncement, but strongly rejecting similarity of distributions generated by dierent exposures to news
at p < .001.
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Table 2: Eects of Announcements on the Perceptions and Expectations of Ination and
Interest rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PastIn ExpIn PastRate ExpRate
Panel A b/se b/se b/se b/se
Announcement -0.142 0.117 -0.004 0.034
(0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.025 0.020 0.024 0.033
Observations 10459 11233 10722 11188
Panel B
Announcement -0.304 0.158 -0.106 -0.067
(0.19) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
∆i -0.267 0.045 -0.059 0.037
(0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
Announcement×∆i 0.297 0.010 0.179 0.129
(0.24) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17)
Survey No No No No
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.026 0.017 0.024 0.035
Observations 9573 10300 9789 10216
Notes: Announcement is a dummy variable being 1 after announcement
and 0 before announcement. ∆i is a dummy variable capturing an interest
rate change (a rise by 25bp in our sample period). Survey, Demographic
and Regional represent xed eects. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***, **,* denote signicance at 99%, 95% and 90% level.
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Figure 3: Eects of Monetary Policy News
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Notes: Kernel density plots. The Red line shows the distribution of expectations and perceptions of indi-
vidual respondents that heard news about the Fed. The Blue line depicts the distribution of expectations
and perceptions of individual respondents that heard no news about the Fed.
where A is the announcement dummy (equals 1 if the response is post-announcement,
zero otherwise), and Z contains both time (announcement round) xed eect as well as
individual-specic (region, gender, nancial literacy and age) xed eects. The coe-
cient estimate of βA reveals whether announcements cause adjustments in perceptions or
expectations of ination and interest rates.
Estimates in Table 2 (Panel A) show there is no statistically signicant eect of an-
nouncements on any of the beliefs we consider. To account for possible dierential eects
of announcement events, such as those with interest rate changes and those without, we
interact the announcement dummy with a dummy variable capturing interest rate hikes.
We opt for a dummy variable for interest rate changes as our sample has seven interest
rate hikes of the same magnitude (25 basis points) and direction.13 Again, as shown in
Table 2 (Panel B), announcements have no eect on beliefs. Figure 4 provides an even
13FOMC meetings with interest rate changes were on Dec 16, 2015  target range set at 0.25-0.50, Dec
14, 2016  0.50-0.75, Mar 15, 2017  0.75-1.00, Jun 14, 2017  1.00-1.25, Dec 13, 2017  1.25-1.50, Mar
21, 2018  1.50-1.75, and Jun 13, 2018  1.75-2.00.
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Figure 4: Announcement eects per meeting.
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deeper view by showing the estimates of the announcement coecient in model (1) and
the corresponding 90% condence intervals for each of the FOMC meetings separately.
In most instances estimates bear no statistical signicance at conventional levels, yet oc-
casionally we observe a positive coecient - for ination perceptions in December 2015
(rate hike), and for interest rate perceptions and expectations in December 2017 (again,
rate hike). While overall, on average, over three years of observations the eect is statisti-
cally nil, this does not yet necessarily mean announcements are irrelevant. As elaborated
earlier, irrelevance occurs if receiving news about the Fed does not matter for beliefs, or
if the number of people who heard news about the Fed is low, and does not change much
after the announcement. We therefore now turn to the role of announcements as a trigger
of news and to the relevance of news for beliefs.
Announcements may raise the fraction of informed consumers, because they trigger
media reports about the Fed. In our data about 30% of consumers report having heard
news about the Fed already before the announcement, yet this share rises signicantly
to approximately 40% in the rst two days after the announcement. To test the causal
impact of announcements on the probability of exposure to policy news, we estimate the
following probit regression (notation is as above, and F is the probit transformation):
F (NewsFedi) = α + βA · A+ ΓZi + εi, (2)
which explains the probability of an individual receiving news about the Fed by FOMC
announcements taking place (in other words, it measures whether more consumers report
that they have received news in the days after the announcement). As the coverage of the
Fed meeting may intensify already shortly before the announcement when journalists and
experts start discussing potential outcomes and their implied consequences, it is fair to
say we estimate a lower bound of the announcement eect on news exposure.14 Results
for model (2) are in Table 3 with the bi-variate system (Γ = 0) reported in column 1, and
added control for the whole set of socioeconomic characteristics and survey xed eects
14If we compare post-announcement data with, for instance, a week beforehand, we would likely observe
an even stronger movement in the amount of additional news received. However, this would come at a
cost of a weaker identication.
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Table 3: Impact of announcements on exposure to news
NewsFed NewsFed
(1) (2)
Announcement 0.078*** 0.098***
(0.01) (0.01)
Survey No Yes
Demographics No Yes
Regional No Yes
Observations 15169 12523
Note: Dependent variable is NewsFed, a dummy variable, which
captures whether the individual respondent received any news
about the Fed. Announcement is a dummy variable being 0
before the announcement and 1 after the announcement. Re-
ported coecient estimates are marginal eects of a probit re-
gression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** denote 99%, **
95% and *90% level of condence
in column 2: announcements increase the probability of receiving news about the Fed by
almost 10%, which means raising the pre-announcement level of news exposure by about
one third.
We now turn to the second channel and investigate if receiving news about the Fed
matters for beliefs. To begin with, we estimate a model similar to (1), with the only
dierence that the main explanatory variable is now the NewsFed dummy (equals to 1
if respondent indicates having heard some news about the Fed, zero otherwise):
yi = α + βNews ·NewsFed+ ΓZi + εi, (3)
Table 4 (Panel A) summarises results for model (3). Odd columns report results
with no controls (Γ = 0), while even columns show estimates that take all available
controls into account. In all cases coecients for the NewsFed variable are signicant
and negative, conrming that expectations of informed consumers dier from those of
uninformed, as one would expect for the information channel. Note that adding controls
reduces the coecient estimate for NewsFed, which is due to a reduction of such biases
as, for example, self-selection (consumers with certain demographic characteristics may
be more likely to follow Fed news, and at the same time may dier in expectations from
the rest of the sample). In all cases the remaining eect is still statistically signicant.
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The eect of exposure to news might be dierent before and after announcement.
If policy announcements improve the precision and clarity of news the eect of news
should be bigger after an announcement. To test this, we amend model (3) by adding an
interaction term between the news and the announcement dummies:
yi = α + βA · A+ βNews ·NewsFed+ βA×News · A×NewsFed+ ΓZi + εi. (4)
Results are in Table 4 (Panel B): odd columns show estimates of (4) without the interac-
tion term (βA×News = 0), and even columns - with the interaction. Compared to Panel A,
estimates with βA×News = 0 in Panel B include the Announcement dummy as an additional
control, and as such conrm the dierence between informed and uninformed subjects,
although signicance drops for perceptions of ination (as established above, there is no
statistically signicant dierence in expected ination between informed and uninformed
cohorts). Results for the interaction eect are mixed: the interaction term is insigni-
cant for interest rates, and although it is highly signicant for ination, interpretations
qualitatively dier for perceptions and expectations. For perceptions of ination, the gap
between informed and uninformed subjects stems mainly from the post-announcement
dierence in beliefs (compare coecients for NewsFed in columns 1 and 2, Panel B of
Table 4). Announcements here only aect beliefs of the informed cohort15, which speaks
in favor of the information channel. For expected ination, the inclusion of the interaction
term alters the coecient and signicance of the announcement dummy, which implies
dierences for the uninformed cohort, too: while the average belief of the informed cohort
after the announcement goes down, it goes up for the uninformed subjects. Although we
control for individual characteristics of respondents, we cannot completely rule out the
endogeneity of exposure to news in this case (see Section 4 for a more detailed discussion).
It follows that even though the causal eect of announcements on exposure to news is
signicant (Table 3), this exogenous variation in the exposure to news does not seem to
aect beliefs apart from some eect on perceived ination.
15Additional estimations of (3) separately for subsamples of informed and uninformed subjects con-
rmed no eect of exposure to news on uninformed subsample and signicant eect on the informed
one.
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Table 5: Impact of News before and after Announcement on Ination Expectation Error
and Expectations Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ape ape ape aeg aeg aeg
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Announcement -0.180 -0.135 0.184 0.066 0.095 0.333***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
NewsFed -0.539*** -0.116 -0.274*** 0.046
(0.14) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14)
NewsFed × Announcement -0.827*** -0.614***
(0.25) (0.18)
Survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.022 0.023 0.024
Observations 8592 8592 8592 9235 9235 9235
Notes: NewsFed is a dummy variable with value 1 if a respondent has heard news about the
Federal Reserve and 0 otherwise. Announcement is a dummy variable being 1 after announce-
ment and 0 before announcement. NewsFed× Announcement is the interaction term. Survey,
Demographic and Regional represent xed eects. Standard errors in parenthesis. ape denotes
the absolute perception gap calculated by taking the absolute value after subtracting CPI ina-
tion from survey individual perceived ination. Similarly aeg is the absolute expectations gap
calculated by taking the absolute value of subtracting the average expected ination of profes-
sional forecasters from the surveyed expected ination of individual consumers. Standard errors
in parentheses. ***, **,* denote signicance at 99%,95% and 90% level.
Our nal question in this subsection is whether communication guides beliefs in the
right direction. To test this we estimate models (1) and (4) where the dependent variable
y is now dened as the absolute dierence between the perceived ination rate and the
actual ination rate (CPI ination) denoted as "ape" (absolute perception error) and the
absolute dierence between the expected ination rate and the average expected ination
rate of professional forecasters (absolute expectations gap, "aeg"). Table 5 presents the
results. Indeed, we observe that the absolute perception error is smaller for people that
have heard news, more so after the announcement (columns (2) and (3) respectively).
If news change perceptions, as discussed above, then the result in Table 5 suggests it
steers perceptions in the right direction as well. For expected ination, being informed
also means having expectations closer to those of professional forecasters, see column (5).
However the marginal contribution of announcement here is blurred by the suspected
endogeneous redistribution of subjects between the informed and the uninformed cohorts,
similarly to what we discussed above with respect to Table 4.
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3.2 Condence
Apart from the mean level of perceptions and expectations, central bank communication
might aect the degree to which respondents are condent in their beliefs. For instance, if
a consumer sees his/her expectations conrmed by the communication of the central bank,
expectations would not change, but condence should increase. If we calculate the share
of consumers who are condent16 in their reported beliefs, our data reveals no dierence
in average condence pre- and post-announcements, same as for the announcement eects
on the level of expectations and perceptions. However, conditioning on exposure to news
produces a sizable eect, for instance, only 28% of consumers who heard no news are
condent in their estimates of future interest rates, while in the cohort of those who have
heard the news, this share increases to 41%.
To investigate the importance of announcements and news for the probability of being
condent, we estimate the following probit regression:
F (Confidencei) = α + βA · Announcement+ ΓZi + εi. (5)
Again, we control for individual socioeconomic characteristics, region, nancial literacy
and time eects, all reected in Z. Results are in Table 6, where panels A and B are
analogous to the level analysis in Table 2. Similar to the level results, in Panel A we
observe no direct eect of announcements on condence, and in Panel B conditioning the
announcement eect on types of announcements (with or without interest rate change)
does not matter. Panel C estimates
F (Confidencei) = α+βA ·A+βNews ·NewsFed+βA×News ·A×NewsFed+ΓZi+εi. (6)
, where A stands again for Announcement. The results again highlight the relevance of
receiving news. Receiving news implies a 8% higher probability of being condent in their
own beliefs. Again we observe dierences in the estimates before and after announcement,
which are falling after the announcement; this is opposite to the direction observed for
16A respondent is classied as condent if (s)he indicates condence of 4 or 5 on the ve-point scale,
otherwise we deem the respondent as lacking condence.
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the means. Given the overall nil eect of announcement, we cannot attribute it to the
surprise component of news or the lack of clarity in policy communication (these would
only aect the informed cohort, hence contributing to the average eect). A redistribution
argument may again apply if subjects with low condence are more likely to receive
news after the announcement than before, and if their condence does not change -
in this case the average condence in the informed cohort would go down, while the
average condence of the uninformed cohort would go up, explaining the result in Panel
C. The exact mechanics of this eect requires further investigation, yet it is clear that our
NewsFed variable captures individual characteristics beyond those already controlled for
by standard demographics data.
The results of this section extend the irrelevance result for monetary policy announce-
ments from levels of expectations to condence, i.e. to uncertainty individual consumers
face when assessing policy relevant variables. In times of ultra low interest rates, providing
certainty might arguably be at least as important as steering expectations.
3.3 Press Conferences
Over the past years there has been a substantial increase in the level of communication
to the general public. Empirical studies provide evidence that with press conferences
and forward guidance the central bank can inuence expectations. However, there is no
evidence whether holding a press conference in comparison to, for instance, announcing
the federal funds target rate, has any value added. Our data allows us to judge directly
on the relevance of holding a press conference by comparing meetings with and without
one. At the descriptive level we observe that in weeks with a press conference the share
of people receiving news about the Fed is slightly higher on average (27% without vs
36% with press conference). The share of people who have heard news about the Fed
before the announcement and after the announcement in the no-press-conference sample
is almost identical (approximately 27%). This is in stark contrast to the 10% increase
(31% to 41%) in the share of subjects exposed to news when a press conference is being
held.
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Table 6: Announcements and Condence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PastIn ExpIn PastRate ExpRate
Panel A b/se b/se b/se b/se
Announcement 0.003 -0.008 -0.009 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C
Announcement
∆i = 0 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
∆i = 0.25 0.007 -0.013 -0.009 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Survey No No No No
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C
NewsFed
Before Announcement 0.115*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.113***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
After Announcement 0.038*** 0.062*** 0.043*** 0.057***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10459 11233 10722 11188
Notes: Announcement is a dummy variable being 1 after announcement and 0 before
announcement. NewsFed is a dummy variable with value 1 if a respondent has heard
news about the Federal Reserve and 0 otherwise. Survey, Demographic and Regional
represent xed eects. Standard errors in parentheses. ∆i captures the interest rate
change announced at a FOMC meeting. ***, **,* denote signicance at 99%, 95%
and 90% level respectively.
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Table 7: Relevance of Press Conference
(1) (2) (3)
NewsFed NewsFed NewsFed
Announcement 0.078*** 0.095***
(0.01) (0.01)
NoPress -0.072*** -0.102***
(0.01) (0.01)
Announcement Press 0.107***
(0.01)
Announcement NoPress 0.015
(0.03)
Survey No Yes Yes
Demographics No Yes Yes
Regional No Yes Yes
Observations 15169 12523 12523
Note: Probit regression with NewsFed as the dependent variable. NewsFed being 1
when a respondent heard news about the Fed and 0 otherwise. Announcement is a
dummy variable being 0 before the announcement and 1 after the announcement.
NoPress is a dummy variable being 1 if it is a FOMC meeting without a press
conference 0 otherwise. Marginal eects reported. ***, **,* denote signicance at
99%,95% and 90% level respectively.
To test this eect econometrically, we augment the probit analysis of the announcement
eect on the exposure to news from Table 3 by adding a dummy "nopress" that equals
1 if there was no press conference, and zero if there was one. Table 7 shows having no
press conferences has a negative and statistically signicant (columns 1 and 2) eect on
the exposure to news. As the main eect of news comes from the announcement, we add
an interaction term between this dummy and the announcement. The marginal eect
of this interaction is reported in column (3). Announcements with a press conference
increase the probability of receiving news by 10.7% while FOMC meetings without press
conferences have no eect that is statistically dierent from zero.
Our analysis thus reveals that holding a press conference has a remarkable added value
as almost all of the positive eect of announcements on news exposure stems from press
conferences. That being said we need to highlight one shortcoming of this distinction.
Meetings with and without press conferences are not perfectly identical as meetings with
press conferences have been used for announcements of major policy changes as well as
for the publication of the quarterly economic projections. As both interest rate change
decisions and the outcome of economic projections have been widely anticipated in our
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sample period, most of the increased news exposure should be attributed to the content
of the press conference of the FOMC meeting.
4 Discussion
Even though consumers are believed to lack knowledge and skills to digest information
about monetary policy, there are experts who make news digestible, and mass media
who deliver such digestible news to consumers. If experts' expectations are rational,
informed consumers predict monetary policy (changes), too, hence announcements aect
neither their expectations nor their expectation errors. Still, announcements may aect
the mean belief in the population by raising the news coverage and through that the
exposure of people to news. In this case, if informed and uninformed subjects dier in
beliefs, the average expectations in the population should change after the announcement.
Empirically we, indeed, observe a signicant increase of the informed cohort after the
announcement, yet there is no signicant impact of announcements on average beliefs.
We also observe announcements exert no signicant eect on beliefs of the informed
cohort, apart from their perceptions of current ination, which seem to update downwards.
Somewhat surprisingly, condence in the informed cohort post-announcement is also lower
than pre-announcement, and this holds for all the four indicators used. In this section we
take a deeper look into these observations.
To clarify the interaction between the two channels, consider expectations formed at
two dates, t = 0 and t = 1. Fraction a(t) of the population, denoted as type a, are aware
of monetary policy developments (we call them informed), while fraction 1−a(t), denoted
as type u, remain unexposed to news (we call them uninformed).17 Let ie,a (t) and ie,u (t)
be expectations of a specic interest rate, such as a car loan, of the above two groups of
consumers. At each date t, the average expected interest rate ie(t) in the population is:
ie (t) = a (t) · ie,a (t) + (1− a (t)) · ie,u (t) (7)
17Types may be seen as exogeneous to consumers and randomly drawn by nature, in which case a(t)
is the probability of being type a. In particular, this view is convenient to interpret the impact of mass
media on a(t): an increase in media coverage makes it more likely that consumers come across news, and
hence probability of being informed increases.
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Before the announcement, at t = 0, mass media communicate expert opinions on
the interest rate the Central bank can set as a target. This informs expectations of the
informed public, ie,a (0). At t = 1 the central bank communicates its policy [target]
interest rate, which aects expectations of informed consumers ie,a (1). Beliefs of type
u consumers are unaected by signals from the Central Bank or experts; they may still
be based on historical macroeconomic data. This simple setup exposes two channels
through which policy communication can impact expectations. First, this occurs through
providing information that diers from expert views. This information channel may
induce a change in ie,a (t) but not in ie,u (t). Second, the impact may come through a
change in the fraction of informed subjects, a (t), which is the exposure to news channel.
Announcements are irrelevant for expectations if ie (0) = ie (1). This happens in
one of the following four cases: (i) the exposure to news channel fails and nobody is
informed, a(1) = a(0) = 0, (ii) some people are informed but both the news and the
information channels fail, a(1) = a(0) > 0 and ie,a (1) = ie,a (0), (iii) only the information
channel fails, a(1) ̸= a(0) but ie,u (0) = ie,a (0) = ie,a (1), and (iv) none of the channels
fails, but the eects through them perfectly oset each other, a (0) · [ie,a (0)− ie,u (0)] =
a (1) · [ie,a (1)− ie,u (0)]. The latter happens, for example, if more people are informed
after the announcement, a(1) > a(0), yet their beliefs update toward those of the un-
informed public, i.e. one of the following holds: either ie,a (0) > ie,a (1) > ie,u (0), or
ie,a (0) < ie,a (1) < ie,u (0).18 We may interpret case (iv) as an inecient communication.
Our results demonstrate the exposure to news channel is alive, and in particular we nd
a(1) > a(0) > 0 (Table 3) thus ruling out cases (i) and (ii). As for the information channel,
we nd that subjects who receive news have lower ination (and interest rate) expectations
and perceptions than those unexposed (Table 4, Panel A), i.e. either ie,u (0) > ie,a (0) or
ie,u (0) > ie,a (1), ruling out the failure of the information channel. Finally, the ineciency
of policy communication (case iv) under a(1) > a(0) > 0 requires that if beliefs of the
informed cohort are below those of the uninformed one, then for the ineciency to hold,
after announcement informed beliefs should update upwards, ie,a (1) > ie,a (0) (conver-
gence of beliefs toward those of the uninformed public). In our data, in contrast, they do
18This employs irrelevance of announcements for the uninformed public, ie,u (1) = ie,u (0).
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not get updated upwards after the announcements (see interaction terms in Table 4, Panel
B), which violates the above equivalence, and thus rules out the inecient communication
case. The remaining explanation for the empirical irrelevance of announcements within
this simple view is the small size of the cohort of informed subjects, which possibly makes
the overall impact of announcements in our sample small and statistically insignicant.
However the cohorts of informed and uninformed consumers are not necessarily ho-
mogeneous. A concern may arise regarding possible endogeneity of exposure to news:
consumers with low expectations and perceptions may be more inclined to read news,
and thus are more likely to receive news after the announcement.19 The endogenous re-
distribution of consumers between the informed and the uninformed cohorts may imply
changes in average expectations within each cohort, while maintaining no change in the
aggregate. Assume that consumers are of two types - fraction λ with low expectation i and
fraction 1− λ with high expectation i, a fraction a(t) of the former and a(t) of the latter
is informed at each t. The average expectation in the population is λ · i+ (1− λ) · i inde-
pendent of t. Average expectations of the informed cohort depend on the endogeneously
determined proportion of high and low types in it:
ie,a(t) =
λ · a(t)
a(t)
· i+ (1− λ) · a(t)
a(t)
· i, (8)
where the fractions on the right-hand side are relative shares of the two types of consumers
in the informed cohort, and a(t) = λ · a(t) + (1 − λ) · a(t) is the total mass of informed
consumers. Now both the exposure to news, a(t), and the average informed beliefs,
ie,a(t), are determined by the distribution of types, given by a(t) and a(t). If types are
not controlled for, the omitted variable bias, and thus the endogeneity problem, arise.
First, we control for a rich array of individual characteristics, which help describe the two
types20 and reduce the bias. Second, an endogenous redistribution of subjects between
the informed and the uninformed cohorts inevitably implies a change in expectations of
the informed cohort is matched by an oppositely directed change in expectations of the
19We thank our discussant, Carola Binder, for stimulating remarks on this issue.
20In particular, gender, age and income are important drivers of expectations, see, e.g. Leung et al.
(2009).
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uninformed cohort.21 This may be the case for ination expectations (Table 4, Panel B,
column (4)) but does not hold for perceptions (same table and panel, columns (1-2)).
Although endogeneity alone cannot explain the result for ination perceptions and does
not completely rule out the information eect on ination expectations, the role of the
information channel appears rather limited.
A similar decomposition of channels applies to condence in beliefs: the information
channel may aect condence of informed consumers, while the news exposure channel
would raise the number of them. The diversity of expert opinions (even though all of
them are rational) implies consumers face more uncertainty before the announcement
than after, and hence condence in expectations implied by expert reports should be
lower than that in expectations based on the policy communication by the central bank.
However an increase in the share of informed subjects after the announcement means
informing subjects who previously did not pay attention to monetary policy news. If
their condence is low, the average condence of the post-announcement informed cohort
may be lower than pre-announcement. This is exactly what we observe in our data.
However we believe a more detailed analysis is needed to investigate the eects of the
announcement on those who always follow the news, or even actively seek for this type of
news, and those who only sporadically receive news.
5 Conclusion
While there is ample evidence of nancial markets' reaction to central bank announce-
ments, little is known on how consumers and the greater public receive this information
and how they respond to it. To address the issue, we have generated a new dataset by
repeatedly running a survey of U.S. consumers just before and right after FOMC press
conferences, ensuring sound identication of the announcement factor. This new data
allows us to track the eect of announcements on perceptions and expectations of rele-
21As a special case, one could x the average belief of the uninformed cohort by assuming its composition
does not change, i.e. (1−a(t))/(1−a(t)) is constant, but in this rather extreme case the average belief of
the informed cohort ought to change upwards after the announcement, as there will be a disproportionate
inow of high types in the informed cohort, or the informed cohort will have beliefs above those uninformed
- both contradict our data. A formal exposition of this argument is available on request.
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vant variables as well as consumers' condence therein. Our main nding is that FOMC
announcements have little measurable eect on consumers' perceptions and expectations
of ination and interest rates.
To rationalize this result, we distinguish between two channels through which an-
nouncements potentially contribute to the expectation formation process. One is the
information channel: announcements give details on the current state of the economy and
on the future directions of monetary policy and economic development of the country.
The second one is the news exposure channel: announcements raise the probability of
receiving news by the public. As for the latter, we nd FOMC press-conferences increase
the probability of receiving news by approximately 10%. As for the former, we do nd
beliefs and condence of consumers who receive news dier from the uninformed cohort.
For ination beliefs we observe an improvement in their quality. In striking contrast to
professional forecasters and nancial markets, who are known to respond to policy news,
for ordinary consumers our data documents only minor eects. While the current system
of policy communication succeeds to an extent in reaching out to consumers (the news
channel) and aecting their expectations (the information channel), more could be done
in this direction.
On average only 35% of consumers in our data are aware of the FOMC announcement
during the announcement week; their share is 10% higher after the announcement than
before. Of course reaching all consumers is neither necessary nor ecient, but it should
be possible to increase this informedness ratio. We nd that so far press conferences have
been a useful tool of drawing media attention to monetary policy announcements, and
through that increasing dissemination of news among the public. Receiving news in turn
can improve the quality of beliefs. If central banks want to use the media channel more
actively, research should focus on identifying what makes media pay more attention to
policy announcements, and what makes people absorb this news.
Outsourcing central bank communication to the media has an advantage of interpret-
ing complex policy wordings in plain language accessible to ordinary consumers. This
comes at a risk that simplied language might, at some point, undermine precision and
thus the positive eect of spreading out news about the Fed might be oset. A number
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of central banks, including the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England (BoE), among others,
attempt to increase the communication outreach via Twitter and other social media; the
BoE has begun to use simplied language to make messages more accessible. Given our
results, this makes well sense as more outreach appears useful for the quality of beliefs.
Whether communicating with the public through social media is the right channel, is still
a big question. On the one hand, this channel mainly covers people who are interested in
receiving news about the central bank. On the other hand, this group of people almost
surely includes experts who then broadcast central bank news to ordinary people, and
thus being actively present on social media with more news and policy guidance may pay
o. With this in mind, it may well make sense for the central banks to keep outsourc-
ing communication with the general public to mass media, while using social networks
for communication with experts and triggering more and more persistent news coverage
through them. However, more research is necessary to identify the right channels, the
right language and the right amount.
Our analysis highlights the importance of media as a transmission device between
the central bank and the greater public. As such, it justies the great eorts of central
banks over the last 20 years to become more transparent with regard to their policy. In
particular, it reects the importance of press conferences, which draw signicant attention
of media outlets, as a crucial tool in managing the expectations of the greater public.
However, it also shows that more eorts are needed to increase the awareness of ordinary
people about monetary policy decisions and their implications.
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Appendix
A Questionnaire
Thank you for participating in our survey. We are interested in your view on current and
future prices, ination and interest rates in the United States.
The survey consists of 15 questions. It usually takes less than 5 minutes to answer
them (most participants do this in 3 minutes). No special knowledge is required. There
is no right or wrong answer to our questions. In fact, any answer is correct as long as it
truly reects your opinion. All responses are anonymous.
If you decide to quit the survey at any stage, please let us know why, by using a
special comment eld available at each page. You will also be able to give us some
general feedback in the end.
Thank you for your help, and welcome to the survey!
1. From your perspective, by how much did prices in general change during the past
12 months? Please use the drop-down menu below. For example, if you think prices
on average have decreased by about 5%, choose "down by 5%"; if you think they
have risen by 5%, choose "up by 5%".
Answer options: dropdown scrollable menu with options from "up by 30%" to "down
by 30%".
2. How condent are you in this answer?
Answer options: Absolutely sure, Rather sure; Neither sure, nor unsure; Rather
unsure; Absolutely unsure.
3. What annual interest rate do you think an average U.S. citizen would be charged, if
they take a car loan of $ 10,000 this week? Please use the drop-down menu below.
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Answer options: dropdown scrollable menu with options from "0%" to "30% and
above".
4. How condent are you in this answer?
Answer options: Absolutely sure, Rather sure; Neither sure, nor unsure; Rather
unsure; Absolutely unsure.
5. By how much do you think prices in general will change during the next 12 months?
Please use the drop-down menu below. For example, if you think prices on average
will decrease by about 5%, choose "down by 5%"; if you think they will rise by 5%,
choose "up by 5%".
Answer options: dropdown scrollable menu with options from "up by 30%" to "down
by 30%".
6. How condent are you in this answer?
Answer options: Absolutely sure, Rather sure; Neither sure, nor unsure; Rather
unsure; Absolutely unsure.
7. What annual interest rate do you think an average U.S. citizen will be charged, if
they take a car loan of $ 10,000 in a year from now? Please use the drop-down menu
below.
Answer options: dropdown scrollable menu with options from "0%" to "30% and
above".
8. How condent are you in this answer?
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Answer options: Absolutely sure, Rather sure; Neither sure, nor unsure; Rather
unsure; Absolutely unsure.
9. If you had an extra $ 1,000 now, how much of this amount, in dollars, you would
spend in the current situation on the following (you can also allocate the whole
amount to just one option):
• Stocks (mutual funds)
• Safe assets (401k, pension funds, treasury bills)
• Term deposit for 3 months or more
• Mortgage contribution (raise mortgage deposit or make an extra payment)
• Buy a car, holiday trip, jewellery or durable goods like a fridge/freezer
• Other household expenses
Answer options: free text box for each option with control that the input content
is a number and the sum of all numbers equals 1000.
10. In your opinion, how many of the following four statements are true?
(a) An investment with a high return is likely to be high risk.
(b) High ination means that the cost of living is increasing rapidly.
(c) It is usually possible to reduce the risk of investing in the stock market by
buying a wide range of stocks and shares.
(d) If you put $ 100 into a no fee savings account with a guaranteed interest rate
of 2% per year, at the end of ve years there will be over $ 110.
Answer options: - none of them is true - 1 is true - 2 are true - 3 are true - all 4 of
them are true
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11. Consider a lottery ticket with a 50% chance of winning $ 100,000 and 50% chance
of getting nothing. What is the LOWEST AMOUNT of money you would accept in
exchange for this lottery ticket? We assume that you would also be happy to swap
the lottery ticket for any amount higher than the one you indicate.
Answer options: from $ 60,000 to $ 5,000 with step $ 5,000, and additional two
options of $ 1,000 and $ 500.
12. Consider two urns, each containing 100 balls coloured either red or blue.
Urn A contains red and blue balls in an unknown proportion. Urn B contains 50
red balls and 50 blue balls.
You will get a prize if you draw a RED ball. From which urn would you draw - from
urn A or B?
Answer options: - Urn A (unknown proportion) - Urn B (50/50)
13. Consider the same two urns as above, again each containing 100 balls coloured either
red or blue.
Urn A contains red and blue balls in an unknown proportion. Urn B contains 50
red balls and 50 blue balls.
You will get a prize if you draw a BLUE ball. From which urn would you draw -
from urn A or B? w
Answer options: - Urn A (unknown proportion) - Urn B (50/50)
14. Question 14 has two version. Question 14before is asked in the wave before the
announcement and Question 14after is asked after the announcement. This way we
try to make sure that there is no overlap.
Q14before
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During the last week, have you heard any news about the monetary policy of the
Federal Reserve (Fed)? What did you hear?
Answer options:
• I have NOT heard any news about the Fed policy
• I have heard that the Fed would raise interest rates
• I have heard that the Fed would keep interest rates at the current level
• I have heard that the Fed would lower interest rates
• I have heard some other news about the Fed, namely: [Open box]
Q14after
During the last week, have you heard any news about the monetary policy of the
Federal Reserve (Fed)? What did you hear?
Answer options:
• I have NOT heard any news about the Fed policy
• I have heard that the Fed raised interest rates
• I have heard that the Fed kept interest rates at the current level
• I have heard that the Fed lowered interest rates
• I have heard some other news about the Fed, namely: [Open box]
15. During the last week, what were your main sources of information on economic and
business conditions? Please choose up to three options.
Answer options:
• Ocial sources (like the webpages of the White House, the Government, sta-
tistical agencies or the Fed)
• Articles in specialised newspapers (like Financial Times, The Wall Street Jour-
nal, The Economist) - online or in print
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